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Abstract
Objective To estimate the impact of a national primary care pay for
performance scheme, the Quality and Outcomes Framework in England,
on emergency hospital admissions for ambulatory care sensitive
conditions (ACSCs).
Design Controlled longitudinal study.
Setting English National Health Service between 1998/99 and 2010/11.
Participants Populations registered with each of 6975 family practices
in England.
Main outcome measures Year specific differences between trend
adjusted emergency hospital admission rates for incentivised ACSCs
before and after the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework
scheme and two comparators: non-incentivised ACSCs and non-ACSCs.
Results Incentivised ACSC admissions showed a relative reduction of
2.7% (95% confidence interval 1.6% to 3.8%) in the first year of the
Quality and Outcomes Framework compared with ACSCs that were not
incentivised. This increased to a relative reduction of 8.0% (6.9% to
9.1%) in 2010/11. Compared with conditions that are not regarded as
being influenced by the quality of ambulatory care (non-ACSCs),
incentivised ACSCs also showed a relative reduction in rates of
emergency admissions of 2.8% (2.0% to 3.6%) in the first year increasing
to 10.9% (10.1% to 11.7%) by 2010/11.
Conclusions The introduction of a major national pay for performance
scheme for primary care in England was associated with a decrease in
emergency admissions for incentivised conditions compared with
conditions that were not incentivised. Contemporaneous health service
changes seem unlikely to have caused the sharp change in the trajectory
of incentivised ACSC admissions immediately after the introduction of
the Quality and Outcomes Framework. The decrease seems larger than
would be expected from the changes in the process measures that were
incentivised, suggesting that the pay for performance schememay have
had impacts on quality of care beyond the directly incentivised activities.
Introduction
Many countries have introduced pay for performance schemes
to improve care for chronic conditions. Rather than directly
rewarding improved patient outcomes, these schemes generally
provide incentives to doctors for improving processes of care
(for example, blood pressure checks for patients with
hypertension) and intermediate outcomes (for example,
cholesterol control in people with diabetes). Evaluations of pay
for performance schemes have found limited impacts on
processes of care,1-3 including improvements in non-incentivised
aspects of care for targeted patients.4 However, pay for
performance schemes have not consistently reduced costs5 6 and
are sometimes associated with unintended consequences and
detrimental effects on quality of care for non-targeted patients.7 8
Even when improvements in processes of care are shown, they
are often modest9 10 and lacking in apparent impacts on patient
outcomes.11 Although several studies have found associations
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between the introduction of pay for performance schemes and
reduced hospital admissions,12-14 complications,15 16 and
mortality,17 a recent systematic review concluded that the effect
of pay for performance schemes on patient outcomes was largely
uncertain.18 Part of the reason for this uncertainty may be that
the impact of pay for performance schemes depends on their
context and design,19-22 and this has led to experimentation with
new and more innovative types of contract.23 24
The implementation of a major pay for performance
scheme—the Quality and Outcomes Framework—in all family
practices in England provides a natural experiment to evaluate
the impact of pay for performance on hospital admissions for
ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs). ACSCs are
conditions for which hospital admissions could be prevented or
reduced through management of the acute episode in the
community or by preventive care. In principle they are
admissions that could be avoided by providing high quality
primary care. Many conditions included in pay for performance
schemes are ambulatory care sensitive so, if the schemes are
successful in improving quality they should lead to a reduction
in hospital admissions. The focus of UK policy makers has been
to reduce emergency (unscheduled or unplanned) admissions
for ACSCs because these represent a large and increasing
proportion of healthcare costs.25
We studied emergency hospital admissions for ACSCs included
in the Quality and Outcomes Framework26 using data for five
years before and seven years after the introduction of the
scheme. We compared rates of hospital admissions for these
conditions with comparators that should not have been directly
affected by the Quality and Outcomes Framework
scheme—namely, emergency admissions for ACSCs that were
not directly incentivised by the Quality and Outcomes
Framework and emergency admissions that were not for ACSCs.
Methods
Pay for performance scheme
The Quality and Outcomes Framework was introduced in April
2004 and implemented simultaneously across all practices in
the four countries of the United Kingdom, including England.
We use data for England. The scheme links up to 25% of family
practitioner income to performance on over 100 clinical and
organisational quality indicators. For the clinical indicators,
practices are awarded points based on the proportion of patients
for whom targets are achieved between a lower achievement
threshold (initially set at 25% for all indicators) and an upper
threshold that varies from 50% to 90% according to the
indicator. The maximum number of points available also varies
by indicator, with more points allocated to intermediate
outcomes indicators (for example, blood pressure control) than
to monitoring indicators (for example, blood pressure
measurement). Points are converted into payments to practices
after adjustment for list size and disease prevalence. Ten chronic
conditions were included in the original scheme, with financial
incentives ranging from £75 ($121; €95) to £4200 per indicator
for the average practice in the first year, and rewards increased
by 68% in the second year. The scheme is periodically reviewed
and quality indicators may be modified or removed, and novel
indicators may be introduced covering existing or new
conditions.27 By 2010/11 (the final year analysed in the study),
16 chronic conditions were included in the scheme.
Sources of data
Our primary data source was hospital episode statistics, a
national database of admissions to hospitals in England, with
information on the reason for admission and the family practices
with which admitted patients are registered. We analysed data
on all emergency admissions to National Health Service
hospitals in England for the financial years (1 April to 31March)
1998/99 to 2010/11, excluding admissions that were transfers
between hospitals. Hospital episodes are recorded for each
period patients are in the care of hospital consultants. We
defined emergency admissions as being the first episode in a
spell of care, coded as an emergency, and admitted from a source
other than another hospital ward or outpatient clinic. Using
ICD-10 (international classification of diseases, 10th revision)
codes for the primary diagnosis, we distinguished between
emergency admissions for ACSCs incentivised in the Quality
and Outcomes Framework, ACSCs that were not incentivised
in the Quality and Outcomes Framework, and non-ACSCs. We
compared the changes in admissions for incentivised ACSCs
before and after the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes
Framework with changes in admissions for the other two groups
of conditions, non-incentivised ACSCs and non-ACSCs.
Inclusion and exclusion criteria
We based our list of ambulatory sensitive conditions on those
used for measuring system performance in the NHS.28 We
modified this list by excluding dental conditions (as these are
not the responsibility of medical practitioners in the United
Kingdom), influenza, and pneumonia (as influenza immunisation
was incentivised to varying degrees during the study period),
malnutrition related diabetes (which is specifically excluded
from the pay for performance scheme), and febrile convulsions
and eclampsia (as the focus of the quality indicators for epilepsy
was on the management of long term epilepsy). We included a
small number of diagnoses adapted from a previous study28:
ICD codes I25 (chronic ischaemic heart disease), I130
(hypertensive heart and renal disease with congestive heart
failure), J04 (acute laryngitis and tracheitis), J44 (other chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease), and N30.0, N30.8, and N30.9
(cystitis). We also included diabetic complications associated
with hypoglycaemia.29 The supplementary file lists the
conditions included in the analysis.
For incentivised ACSCs we included admissions with a primary
diagnosis of the following conditions, which have been
continually incentivised under the Quality and Outcomes
Framework since the introduction of the scheme: asthma,
coronary heart disease, congestive heart disease, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes (separated into
admissions for hyperglycaemia and hypoglycaemia), epilepsy,
hypertension, and stroke. For non-incentivised ACSCs we
included all remaining diagnostic categories of ACSCs,
providing the relevant conditions were not targeted under the
pay for performance scheme at any time during the study period.
The five non-incentivised ACSCs with the highest admission
rates in 2010/11 were ear, nose, and throat conditions;
dehydration; cellulitis; pyelenophritis and urinary tract infection;
and anaemia. Non-ACSCs consisted of all remaining admissions.
Statistical analysis
We aggregated admissions to the level of the family practice
and excluded from the analysis those practices with a registered
population smaller than 1000 (an average of 117 practices in
each year). We used a balanced panel of practices appearing in
all of the financial years—6975 different practices (mean
population 6264 patients). Admission rates were calculated as
the total number of admissions divided by the total registered
practice population for that year.
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We analysed data for five years before (1998/99 to 2002/03)
and seven years after (2004/05 to 2010/11) the introduction of
the Quality and Outcomes Framework. Although the scheme
started in April 2004, practices had been aware of its broad
outline since early 2003, and we therefore allowed for a possible
“anticipation effect” in the preparatory year, 2003/04. There
were large absolute differences in the rates of admission for
incentivisedACSCs, non-incentivisedACSCs, and non-ACSCs.
We analysed the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the
admission rates, which can be interpreted in the same way as
the logarithmic transformation but can be used when the
dependent variable can take zero values. Therefore we estimated
the effect of the Quality and Outcomes Framework on the
proportionate, rather than on the absolute, differences between
admission rates for incentivisedACSCs and the other two groups
of conditions.
Before the introduction of the Quality andOutcomes Framework
in 2004, admissions for incentivised ACSCs were increasing
on average around 3% per annum—less rapidly than for
non-incentivised ACSCs and around 0.5% less rapidly than for
non-ACSCs. In the absence of the Quality and Outcomes
Framework, if the difference in trends continued, incentivised
ACSCs would have increased less than both non-incentivised
ACSCs and non-ACSCs after 2004. We therefore allowed for
differences in the underlying trends in admission rates between
incentivised ACSCs and the control groups of admissions by
fitting a linear annual trend to each series in the period before
the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. We
allowed family practices to have different initial admission rates
when fitting these linear trends. We then calculated the trend
adjusted admission rate for each of the three types of admission
as the difference between the actual and predicted admission
rate given the pre-Quality and Outcomes Framework trend for
that series. We estimated the impact of the Quality and
Outcomes Framework scheme using the difference between the
trend adjusted admission rate for incentivised ACSCs and the
trend adjusted admission rate for non-incentivised ACSCs or
non-ACSCs. Adjusting each series for the underlying trends
leads to a more conservative estimate of the impact of the
scheme.
Using the low income scheme index recorded in the first year
of the Quality and Outcomes Framework scheme, we examined
whether the trend adjusted differences in emergency hospital
admissions for incentivised ACSCs relative to non-incentivised
ACSCs and non-ACSCs were affected by the level of income
deprivation in the practice population. The low income scheme
index records the proportions of prescriptions in each practice
that are dispensed without charge because the patient has a low
income. We estimated the effect of the Quality and Outcomes
Framework separately for practices with above and below
median low income scheme index scores.
We conducted a supplementary analysis of admissions for
incentivised ACSCs that does not involve comparison with a
control group.We tested for differences in trends in admissions
for incentivised ACSCs for the periods 1998/99 to 2002/03
(pre-Quality andOutcomes Framework) and 2004/05 to 2010/11
(after the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework)
using an interrupted time series analysis.30 The supplementary
file gives full details of the methods.
We illustrated the financial implications of changes in
admissions for incentivised ACSCs due to the Quality and
Outcomes Framework for one financial year by applying the
estimated change in the admission rate between 2003/04 and
2010/11 to the admission rate in the final year (2003/04) of the
pre-Quality and Outcomes Framework period for a population
of 53 million for England in mid-2011,31 and assuming an
average cost per ACSC admission of £1739.32All analyses were
performed using STATA v13.
Results
Changes in rates of emergency admissions
Over the study period the emergency admission rate for all
conditions increased by 34%, from 637.0 per 10 000 person
years in 1998/99 to 852.6 per 10 000 person years in 2010/11.
Admission rates increased by 39% (from 33.7 per 10 000 person
years in 1998/99 to 46.8 per 10 000 person years in 2010/11)
for non-incentivised ACSCs and by 41% (from 516.4 per 10
000 person years in 1998/99 to 727.6 per 10 000 person years
in 2010/11) for non-ACSCs. The emergency admission rate
decreased by 10% (from 87.0 per 10 000 person years to 78.2
per 10 000 person years) for incentivised ACSCs over the same
period. Over the study period, ACSCs accounted for 16% of all
emergency admissions, of which 67% were for incentivised
conditions and 33% were for non-incentivised conditions.
The emergency admission rate before the introduction of the
Quality and Outcomes Framework was increasing at a rate of
5.0% per annum (95% confidence interval 4.5% to 5.5%) for
non-incentivised ACSCs and 4.2% per annum (3.9% to 4.6%)
for non-ACSCs (fig 1⇓ and supplementary table A1). In contrast,
the rate of emergency admissions for incentivised ACSCs was
increasing at a rate of only 1.7% (1.2% to 2.2%) per annum
over the same period.
Estimates of effect of introduction of pay for
performance scheme
The table⇓ summarises the percentage differences between the
trend adjusted admission rates for the incentivised and
non-incentivised ACSCs and non-ACSCs and these are plotted
in figure 2⇓. In the preparatory year for the Quality and
Outcomes Framework (2003/04), the difference between the
trend adjusted admission rates for incentivised and
non-incentivised ACSCs was not significantly different from
zero. However, in the first full year of the Quality and Outcomes
Framework scheme (2004/05), when practice performance was
measured and incentivised, the trend adjusted admission rate
for incentivised ACSCs was 2.7% (95% confidence interval
1.6% to 3.8%) less than the trend adjusted admission rate for
non-incentivised ACSCs. By the seventh year of the Quality
and Outcomes Framework scheme (2010/11), the trend adjusted
rate for incentivised ACSCs was 8.0% (6.9% to 9.1%) less than
for non-incentivised ACSCs. The trend adjusted admission rate
for the incentivised ACSCs also decreased relative to the trend
adjusted rate for non-ACSCs, from 2.8% (2.0% to 3.6%) less
in the first year of the Quality and Outcomes Framework scheme
(2004/05) to 10.9% (10.1% to 11.7%) less by the seventh year
(2010/11).
Income deprivation
The effect of the Quality and Outcomes Framework scheme on
trend adjusted emergency admissions was similar for practices
with above or belowmedian values for income deprivation (see
supplementary tables A2 andA3 and figures A1 andA2). There
was a larger reduction in trend adjusted admission rates for
incentivised ACSCs than for non-incentivised ACSCs for
practices with above average values for income deprivation,
although the difference was only statistically significant in
2010/11.
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Supplementary analysis
Interrupted time series analysis of admission rates for
incentivised ACSCs, without comparison with other types of
emergency admissions, showed that they were increasing in the
pre-Quality and Outcomes Framework period (see
supplementary table A4). In the preparatory year (2003/04) the
increase was 2.5%. After the introduction of the Quality and
Outcomes Framework in 2004/05, the admission rate for
incentivised ACSCs decreased at a rate of 3.6% per year (see
supplementary figure A3). Comparing the actual trend in
admissions from 2004/05 to 2010/11 with the projected trend
from the pre-Quality and Outcomes Framework period, the
estimated impact of the scheme was to reduce emergency
admissions for incentivised ACSCs in 2010/11 by 16.6% (95%
confidence interval 13.5% to 19.5%).
Estimated impact on overall utilisation and
cost
The estimated reduction in admissions for incentivised ACSCs
associated with the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes
Framework scheme was 8% in the financial year 2010/11,
equivalent to a reduction of approximately 53 000 emergency
admissions across England. This is a potential cost saving of
around £92.5m ($149m; €117m) per year. The estimated effect
from the interrupted time series analysis is a reduction of
approximately 75 500 emergency admissions in the financial
year 2010/11, which is a saving of £131.5m.
Discussion
Our results show a moderate and sustained reduction in
emergency hospital admissions for ambulatory care sensitive
conditions (ACSCs) that were incentivised under the UK’s
Quality andOutcomes Framework pay for performance scheme.
This reduction was 2.7% in the first year of the scheme,
increasing to 8.0% in the seventh year. Our supplementary
analysis, which considered only the underlying trend in
admissions for the incentivised ACSCs, showed a larger
reduction, which also coincided with the introduction of the
Quality and Outcomes Framework scheme.
Strengths and weaknesses of this study
Our study is observational and subject to several limitations.
Firstly, although hospital episode statistics records all emergency
admissions to the NHS, any changes in the consistency and
accuracy of data recording during the study period would affect
our findings, particularly if incentivised conditions were less
often recorded as the primary reason for admission from 2004.
Secondly, we focused on non-incentivised conditions defined
as ambulatory care sensitive by the NHS, and this limits
generalisability of the study in countries that use different
definitions. However, there is broad agreement across systems
on the core group of ambulatory sensitive conditions, and our
supplementary interrupted times series analysis—focusing solely
on trends for incentivised conditions—produced a similar result
to that of the main analysis. Thirdly, admission trends for
incentivised and non-incentivised conditions were divergent
before the introduction of the pay for performance scheme. This
violates the assumption of parallel trends required for a simple
difference in difference analysis, and we therefore adjusted
admission rates for underlying trends in the pre-Quality and
Outcomes Framework period. As a result, our estimate of the
effect of the Quality and Outcomes Framework scheme in the
main analysis is likely to be conservative. Finally, as the Quality
and Outcomes Framework is a national intervention
implemented by almost all family practices, there are no control
practices and we therefore could not test our assumption that
pre-intervention admission trends would have continued in the
absence of incentives.
Effect of primary care on hospital admissions
Estimates from previous studies of the proportion of hospital
admissions that can potentially be avoided with appropriate
ambulatory care range from 5% to 79%.33 In our study, 16% of
emergency admissions were designated as sensitive to
ambulatory care. The empirical evidence on the effect of
improving quality of primary care on emergency admissions is
mixed, and several studies have found little or no association
between quality of care and admissions.34-37 Previous studies on
the Quality and Outcomes Framework scheme have found
associations between improved primary care management and
reduced emergency admissions for chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease,38 coronary heart disease,39 and stroke40 but
not for hypertension.41 For diabetes, improved glycaemic control
in people with diabetes is associated with fewer emergency
admissions for hyperglycaemia without any increase in
admissions for hypoglycaemia.29
Effect of incentives in primary care on
hospital admissions
We found that the trend adjusted admission rate for ACSCs
included in the Quality and Outcomes Framework fell by 2.7%
in the first year of the scheme relative to the rate for ACSCs
that were not included. This increased to 8% by the seventh
year, equivalent to an annual reduction in emergency admissions
of 53 000 nationally. This result cannot easily be attributed to
measured improvements in process indicators that occurred after
the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework
scheme, as previous studies suggest that these were generally
modest3 and would therefore be unlikely to explain the rapid
change in admissions observed in our analysis. Furthermore,
the improvements that did occur were greater for indicators
relating to measurement (for example, blood pressure recording)
than to intermediate outcomes42 or treatments,7 which would be
more likely to have a rapid impact on admissions. Although the
Quality and Outcomes Framework has the potential to have a
major impact on health outcomes,43 in our view the
improvements that have occurred under the scheme for
indicators likely to have an immediate impact on admissions
have not been sufficient for us to attribute the observed decrease
in admissions solely to the Quality and Outcomes Framework
scheme. We reached a similar conclusion in our analysis of a
hospital based pay for performance scheme (the UK’s advancing
quality programme), where we suggested that observed
improvements in patient outcomes were partly attributable to
unmeasured changes associated with the introduction of pay for
performance, rather than to changes in incentivised process
measures.17
Other system changes affecting admissions
Several other changes within the NHS during the study period
impacted on hospital admissions. For example, in 2004 a target
for patients to wait for no more than four hours in emergency
departments; in 2004 a change to the national contract for family
practices that allowed them to opt-out of providing out of hours
care (most practices did so); and in 2005/06 a change in the
method of payment for hospitals, from a block contract system
that paid hospitals a fixed amount regardless of volume to a
system that paid hospitals for each patient seen or treated. Each
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of these changes contributed to the overall increase in emergency
admissions observed over the study period and will have biased
our results if they had differential impacts on admissions for
incentivised and non-incentivised conditions. For example, the
introduction of the four hour wait target resulted in thousands
of additional patients being admitted to hospital to avoid
breaching the target, whowould otherwise have been dealt with
within emergency departments and discharged.44 Our results
will have been affected if the chances of such a “breach”
admission are greater for patients presenting with, for example,
dehydration than for patients presenting with cardiac chest pain.
Admissions for heart disease and stroke accounted for 50% of
admissions for incentivised ACSCs over the study period, and
reductions in risk factors such as smoking generated secular
trends, which we controlled for in our analysis. Several other
quality improvement initiatives specifically tackling these
conditions were implemented during our study period. National
standards for the management of coronary heart disease in
England were introduced in 200045 and included a
recommendation for the establishment of a national network of
rapid access chest pain clinics that were rolled out between 2002
and 2006. Guidance from the National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence was also issued on the management of
myocardial infarction in 2001 (www.nice.org.uk), and British
Hypertension Society guidelines on the management of
hypertension were issued in 1999 and 2004 (www.bhsoc.org)
followed by NICE guidance on hypertension in 2006. NICE
guidance was also issued on the management of heart failure in
2003. Some of these might have impacted on the early changes
we observed in the study, but none could readily be linked to
the apparent sharp drop in admissions observed from 2004/05
onwards.
One potential explanation is that previous interventions that
might have influenced patterns of admission were reinforced
with the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework
scheme. If so, some of the changes in admission patterns that
we observed could have been directly due to the Quality and
Outcomes Framework (for example, better blood pressure
control in stroke) and some may have been related to increased
sensitivity to previous clinical guidelines (for example, the
importance of early referral for transient ischaemic attack). This
would be consistent with other research on quality improvement,
which suggests that there is no “magic bullet” to improving
quality: rather, interventions need to be multifaceted and
sustained over time to produce major change.46
Conclusions and policy implications
Improvements in preventive medicine and disease management
in primary care offer the hope of better patient outcomes and
reduced demand for secondary care, bringing benefits for both
health and healthcare expenditure. The UK’s Quality and
Outcomes Framework pay for performance scheme was
introduced with the expectation that financial and reputational
incentives (public reporting of performance allowing comparison
between providers) would promote high quality primary care,
improve patient outcomes, and reduce emergency admissions
to secondary care. We found relative reductions in rates of
emergency admissions for conditions incentivised under the
Quality and Outcomes Framework scheme, particularly for
coronary heart disease and stroke. The potential costs savings
from these avoided admissions (£92.5m ($149m; €117m) by
2010/11) may seem small in comparison to the overall cost of
the scheme (£1bn per annum), but it is important to note that
benefits other than reduced admissions were expected from the
scheme, including improved use of clinical computing systems
and substantial uplifts in family practitioners’ income to
encourage recruitment and retention in the specialty.
Past research has focused on the direct consequences of financial
incentives to improve quality and on the unexpected negative
consequences of such incentives. Our results suggest that further
research should also be carried out on the potential long term
benefits and harms of pay for performance schemes on health
outcomes.
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Table
Table 1| Estimates of effect of Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF): percentage differences between trend adjusted emergency
admission rates for incentivised and non-incentivised ambulatory care sensitive conditions (ACSCs)
Control group: non-ACSCsControl group: non-incentivised ACSCs
Period and year P value% difference* (95% CI)P value% difference* (95% CI)
Pre-QOF:
0.3510.38 (−0.42 to 1.18)0.028−1.25 (−2.36 to −0.14)1998/99
0.0021.25 (0.45 to 2.05)0.0002.08 (0.96 to 3.19)1999/2000
0.000−2.71 (−3.50 to −1.91)0.227−0.69 (−1.80 to 0.43)2000/01
0.7250.14 (−0.65 to 0.94)0.8090.14 (−0.98 to 1.25)2001/02
0.0220.93 (0.14 to 1.73)0.622−0.28 (−1.39 to 0.83)2002/03
Preparatory:
0.561−0.24 (−1.03 to 0.56)0.983−0.01 (−1.12 to 1.10)2003/04
Post-QOF:
0.000−2.78 (−3.58 to −1.99)0.000−2.68 (−3.79 to −1.57)2004/05
0.000−8.21 (−9.01 to −7.41)0.000−6.98 (−8.09 to −5.87)2005/06
0.000−8.65 (−9.45 to −7.85)0.000−7.66 (−8.78 to −6.55)2006/07
0.000−11.33 (−12.13 to −10.53)0.000−10.51 (−11.63 to −9.40)2007/08
0.000−10.50 (−11.30 to −9.70)0.000−7.53 (−8.64 to −6.41)2008/09
0.000−13.99 (−14.79 to −13.19)0.000−11.00 (−12.12 to −9.89)2009/10
0.000−10.94 (−11.74 to −10.15)0.000−7.98 (−9.09 to −6.87)2010/11
*Percentage difference between trend adjusted admission rate for incentivised ACSCs and trend adjusted admission rates for non-incentivised ACSCs and for
non-ACSCs. Trend adjusted admission rate is logarithm of admission rate for year minus logarithm of admission rate predicted from fitting a linear trend for pre-QOF
period 1998/99 to 2002/03.
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Figures
Fig 1 Percentage change in emergency admissions relative to 1998/99 with no adjustment for trend. ACSC=ambulatory
care sensitive conditions; QOF=Quality and Outcomes Framework
Fig 2 Percentage differences between trend adjusted emergency admission rates for incentivised ACSCs (ambulatory care
sensitive conditions) and non-incentivised ACSCs and non-ACSCs. The trend adjusted admission rate is the logarithm of
the actual admission rate for the year minus the logarithm of the admission rate predicted from fitting a linear trend for the
pre-Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) period 1998/99-2002/03
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